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ASSAULT ON GRENADA AND THE FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS
This Note discusses the constitutional arguments in favor of press access to mili-
tary operations. Following an initial discussion of the role of the press in American
democracy, the author cites a series of Supreme Court cases, concluding that a right
of press access to military operations exists. This constitutional right is then ex-
amined in light of its unprecedented violation during the invasion of Grenada. The
author proposes a realistic compromise between the need for national security and the
press right to access.
INTRODUCTION
BEFORE DAWN ON October 25, 1983, the United States mili-
tary invaded Grenada,' a tiny Caribbean island that was a Brit-
ish colony until 1974. The President of the United States, Ronald
Reagan, announced the invasion at a White House news conference
at 9 a.m.-four hours after the operation had begun. 2 That after-
noon, Secretary of State George P. Shultz also held a news confer-
ence in Washington, D.C., in which he stated that the invasion was
undertaken because of the President's "concern for the welfare of
American citizens living on Grenada" and because the United
States had received an "urgent request from.., the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States [O.E.C.S.] ... to help them in their desire
to insure peace and stability in their area,"3 following the overthrow
and assassination of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.
For the first two and one-half days of the invasion, American
news reporters were denied access to the military operations.4 This
1. Kaufman, Airports Seized, Drive on Capital Faces Stiff Fire, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,
1983, at Al, col. 4.
2. Text ofReagan's Announcement of Invasion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A16, col.
1; see also P. BRAFsUP, BATTLE LNEs 83 (1985).
3. Transcript of Shultz's News Conference on Why US. Acted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,
1983, at A18, col. I; see also US. Sums Up Reasonsfor Invading Grenada, N.Y. Times, Dec.
17, 1983, at A3, col. 3 (Reagan administration citing communist presence and safety of
Americans as justifications for invasion); Letter Asking U.S. to Act, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,
1983, at A19, col. 5 (text of Oct. 23 letter from O.E.C.S. to the United States requesting
military intervention).
4. Farrell, US. Allows 15 Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1983, at A13, col. 5.
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was the first such press exclusion in American history5 and was a
violation of the first amendment guarantees of free speech and
press. The exclusion of reporters as independent observers caused
serious and irreparable harm to the ability of the American public
to make fully-informed decisions about the use of military force in
the invasion of Grenada7 and established a dangerous precedent for
future restraints on access to the press.' Indeed, then White House
Chief of Staff James A. Baker III told reporters that although he
did not know of the plan to exclude the press beforehand, he ap-
proved of it and would exclude the press again in a similar
situation.9
This Note will initially discuss the origins and development of
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press and the role
of this freedom in a democracy.10 Next, the right of access to overt
military operations" in light of relevant Supreme Court decisions
will be reviewed. 2 Then, this Note will analyze the constitutional-
ity of the press exclusion from the invasion of Grenada. 3 Finally,
possible solutions to the problem of access suggested by a panel
commissioned by the Pentagon, by various press entities, and by the
5. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
I fear that in Grenada, the real price the administration is worried about is the
one which policymakers must pay when independent observers and journalists can
provide their own accounts of events, and the public does not have to rely on official
hand-outs and the networks do not have to run Government videotape and film.
Nor does it make much sense to suggest that reporters must be barred or their
access restricted in order to preserve the secrecy of the Grenada invasion. There is
a long and honored tradition of journalists pledging secrecy and keeping that pledge
during the opening phase of a sensitive military operation .... I hope that there is
nothing to hide from our citizens about the invasion. I am certain that there is not
justification for maintaining a policy which shrouds the truth and hides the reality
from independent journalists and American camera crews .... For my part Mr.
President, I am wholly unwilling to cede civilian authority on this issue. The ad-
ministration's policy of censorship about events in Grenada is unprecedented, seem-
ingly unjustified, and probably unconstitutional.
CONG. Rac. S14877 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
6. See infra notes 30-69 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 9.
9. Friendly, Weinberger Tied to Curb on Press, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, at A19, col.
1. Apparently, the Reagan administration has decided to continue its policy on restricting
press access to overt military operations. See Landau, Military Censorship: Two More Les-
sons, The Plain Dealer, Apr. 9, 1986, at A27, col. 1 (criticizing the Pentagon for excluding the
press from U.S. military operations held in March, 1986 off the coasts of Libya and
Honduras).
10. See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
11. This Note will not discuss a right of access to covert military operations.
12. See infra notes 30-69 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 109-69 and accompanying text.
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author will be discussed. 14
I. THE ROLE OF THE PRESS AND THE GENERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. The Structural Role of the Press
Since the establishment of our republican form of government,
much has been written about the function of the first amendment in
the workings of a free society." Individuals as diverse as Thomas
Jefferson" and Ronald Reagan 7 have written about the critical role
of an untrammeled press as a preserver of a free society based on
self-government. Professor Thomas I. Emerson 8 described this
role well when he wrote:
The public, as sovereign, must have all information available in
order to instruct its servants, the government. As a general
proposition, if democracy is to work, there can be no holding
back of information; otherwise ultimate decision-making by the
people, to whom that function is committed, becomes impossible.
Whether or not such a guarantee of the right to know is the sole
purpose of the first amendment, it is surely a main element of the
provision and should be recognized as such.19
The structural role of the press in providing the American pub-
14. See infra notes 170-220 and accompanying text.
15. See, ag., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society
is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable to a free society. Not only does the press
enhance personal self-fulfillment by providing the people with the widest possible range of
fact and opinion, but it also is an incontestable precondition of self-government"); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("What is at stake
here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of
governmental affairs .... It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-determina-
tion and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy lies in a
free exchange of views on public issues.").
16. In a letter to Edward Carrington dated January 16, 1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
"The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be
to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government
without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I would not hesitate a moment to
prefer the latter." IV WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 359-60.
17. In observance of National Newspaper Week, October 9-15, 1983, President Ronald
Reagan wrote: "There is no more essential ingredient than a free, strong, and independent
press to our continued success in what the Founding Fathers called our 'noble experiment' in
self-government." EDrrOR & PUBLISHER, Oct 8, 1983, at 17.
18. Emerson is the Lines Professor of Law at Yale University.
19. Emerson, Legal Foundation and the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 14
(1976); see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) ("The predominant
purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled press as a
vital source of public information.").
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liec with information about the operation and activities of its govern-
ment has also frequently been recognized by the Supreme Court.
The Court in Mills v. Alabama,2 ° discussed the critical function of
the press in assuring governmental accountabilty to the people. Jus-
tice Black, writing for the majority, stated:
The Constitution specifically selected the press .. to play an
important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitution-
ally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people re-
sponsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.
Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize govern-
mental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change
... muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Consti-
tution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our soci-
ety and keep it free. 2
Historically, the liberty of the press guaranteed by the first
amendment was considered to be limited primarily to "immunity
from previous restraints or censorship."22 This view comported
with the traditional Anglo-American fear of prior restraints as the
major threat to freedom of the press.23 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has recognized that the breadth of first amendment protection
for the press must extend beyond merely barring prior restraints. In
Near v. Minnesota,24 the Court explicitly recognized that the free-
dom of the press continues to be challenged by new and unique
threats.25
For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,26 the Court
found a Louisiana license tax imposed on newspapers with circula-
tions greater than 20,000 copies per week unconstitutionally restric-
tive of the freedom of the press. The tax was imposed for the
privilege of selling advertising.27 The Court adopted the following
20. 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (state statute, which made it a crime to publish an editorial on
election day which solicits voters to vote in a particular way, violates the first amendment).
21. Id. at 219.
22. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). However, as the Court points out, the
immunity from prior restraint is not absolute, for "[n]o one would question but that a govern-
ment might prevent ... publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops." Id.
23. "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication .... " Id. at 713 (quoting Black-
stone). See generally L. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (discussing the history
of freedom of the press in Anglo-American society).
24. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
25. Id. at 716-17.
26. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
27. Id. at 240.
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test, formulated by Judge Thomas M. Cooley, for determining first
amendment violations: "'The evils to be prevented [by the first
amendment] were not the censorship of the press merely, but any
action of the government by means of which it might prevent such
free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely
essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their
rights as citizens.' "28 The Court viewed the license tax as "a delib-
erate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circula-
tion of information to which the public is entitled by virtue of the
constitutional guarantees."29
Thus, when faced with a challenge to the freedom of the press,
the courts should take two preliminary factors into consideration.
First, an informed public is vital to the democratic institutions upon
which our government is based. Second, freedom of the press is a
dynamic concept which requires a constant evolution of protective
measures.
B. The Development of the Right of Access
The process of gathering news about governmental activities has
operated continuously since America was colonized,30 yet the devel-
opment of a constitutional right of access to information has oc-
curred relatively recently. One commentator, however, argued for
the existence of that right four decades ago. In Legal Control of the
Press, published in 1944, Frank Thayer"1 argued that the right of
access to newsworthy information was implicitly granted to the
people in the United States Constitution. Thayer maintained that
the right of access was subsumed by the first amendment because
newsgathering is a prerequisite for accurate and complete reporting
of governmental activities. Neither the United States Constitution
nor the several state constitutions, Thayer argued, prohibited news-
28. Id. at 249-50 (quoting J. COOLEY, 2 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886
(8th ed. 1927)). The Court went on to state: "The predominant purpose of the grant of
immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public
information... and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon
misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press can-
not be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250.
29. Grosean, 297 U.S. at 250.
30. See S. KOBRE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1972); F. L.
Morr, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY 1690-1960 (1969); NEWSPAPER HISTORY
FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY (G. Boyce, J. Curran, P. Win-
gate eds. 1978); A. SMITH, THE NEWSPAPER: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 72-86, 133-41,
168-70 (1979).
31. Thayer was a member of the Illinois Bar and a professor ofjournalism and lecturer
on law of the press at the University of Wisconsin School of Journalism.
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gathering, so the right of access is reserved to the people.32
The Supreme Court did not expressly refer to a constitutional
right of access to information until 1965. In Zemel v. Rusk,33 the
Court ruled that the Secretary of State's refusal to grant Zemel a
passport to enable him to travel to Cuba did not violate any first
amendment rights. 34 In addition to the fact that the Court did not
believe Zemel's first amendment claim to be bona fide, the Court
ruled that the denial of a passport was an "inhibition of action"
rather than an inhibition of speech.35  The Court then stated in
dicta that "[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information., 3 6 This statement im-
plies, that to some degree, a constitutional right of access to infor-
mation does exist.
Seven years later, in Branzburg v. Hayes,37 the Court again im-
plied that some constitutional right to gather information exists.
The issue in Branzburg was whether the first amendment protected
a reporter who refused to divulge to a grand jury the names of confi-
dential news sources in connection with a pending criminal investi-
gation. 38 The reporter protested that disclosure would severely
burden his ability to gather news because informants would be un-
willing to give information if they knew that their identities could
32. F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS 139 (1944). This Note will use the
terms "right of access" and "right to gather news" interchangeably. Although the Supreme
Court has stated that the press has no greater right of access than does the public, Pen v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974), the Court has recognized that in situations where it is
impracticable or impossible for all who might desire to attend to do so, the press acts as a
surrogate for the public. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966), the Court stated,
"In a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily on the press to
bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations." See also Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1974) (Press access "affords citizens a form of
legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair administration of justice.");
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("For most
citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic.
In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the
means by which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelli-
gent self-government.").
33. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the Court ruled that the Secretary of State, acting
under statutory authority, could properly deny the appellant a passport to travel to Cuba,
based on the Secretary's determination that travel to Cuba posed a threat to national security.
Id. at 14-15. Zemel was a tourist who desired to travel to Cuba to satisfy his "'curiosity
about the state of affairs in Cuba'" and to make him "'a better informed citizen.' " Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 16-17.
36. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
37. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
38. Id. at 708-09.
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be revealed. 9 The Court found this argument to have some merit4
but determined that a reporter's interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of news sources must give way to societal interests in pur-
suing and prosecuting crimes.4 Yet, the Court recognized a
constitutional right to gather information, pointing out that "with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated."'42 Justice Stewart wrote in dissent: "No less
important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of in-
formation. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for
without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would
be impermissibly compromised."'4
The Supreme Court, for the first time, squarely faced the issue
of the press and public right of access to information in the control
of the government in the 1974 companion cases of Pell v.
Procunier4 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.4 In Pell, the Court
upheld a California Department of Corrections regulation which
provided that "[p]ress and other media interviews with specific indi-
vidual inmates will not be permitted."46 The Court decided the
case only after recognizing that the public and the press have gen-
eral access to all parts of California prisons "to observe prison con-
ditions,"'47 and that newsmen are permitted to visit both minimum
and maximum security sections of the prisons and to "stop and
speak about any subject to any inmate whom they might encoun-
ter."4" It was also noted that newsmen are permitted to enter the
prisons "to interview inmates selected at random by the corrections
officials." 4 9 The level of access which already existed in the depart-
39. Id. at 682.
40. Id. at 693-95.
41. Id at 695.
42. Id at 681.
43. Id. at 728.
44. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
45. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). For a discussion of Pell and Saxbe, see Note, The Media, The
Public and Government-Is There a Constitutional Right of Access?, 39 LA. L. REv. 1005
(1979).
46. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added). The regulation was adopted following a
"violent episode" that California prison authorities believed was "at least partially attributa-
ble to the former policy of... face-to-face prisoner-press interviews." Id at 831. Appar-
ently, because the press had chosen to interview the same inmates repeatedly, a small group
of inmates had obtained disproportionate notoriety and influence among their fellow inmates.
Id. at 831-32.
47. Id at 830.
48. Id
49. Id. In Saxbe, the Court, by the same five-to-four majority, upheld a Federal Bureau
of Prisons policy statement that contained a similar prohibition against press interviews with
1986]
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ment was a significant factor in the Court's decision.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,'O the Pell Court's extensive discussion of
the general access afforded to the press and the public in the Cali-
fornia prisons demonstrates that the governmental prohibition of
access must be considered in light of the total access that is other-
wise afforded.5" Denial of access is not likely justified unless there is
in fact an opportunity for the press and the public to observe prison
conditions.5 2
The Supreme Court has also recently addressed the right of
press access to information in criminal trials. In Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia,53 the Court ruled that the right of the public
and the press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the first
and fourteenth amendments. 4 The Court found that the right of
access to criminal trials exists because of the "unbroken, uncontra-
dicted history"55 of open trials in Anglo-American society, which
individually selected inmates. The Court found the Saxbe case to be "constitutionally indis-
tinguishable" from Pell and therefore fully controlled by it. Saxbe, at 850.
50. 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (Brennan, J. and Powell, J., concurring in dissent). In
Houchins, a plurality of the Court upheld a sheriff's decision to deny the press access to a
county jail to observe the conditions therein. As Stevens points out in his dissent, this is
clearly inconsistent with the analysis of the majority of the Court in Pell. IL at 29-30. The
vote in Houchins was four to three. Justices Blackmun and Marshall did not participate in
the consideration or decision of the case.
It is likely that had Marshall participated in Houchins, he would not have agreed with the
plurality opinion inasmuch as he joined the dissenting opinions in Pell and Saxbe and has
consistently voted in favor of access in all the subsequent right-of-access cases. It is also
likely that had Blackmun participated he would have disagreed that the sheriff's denial of
access was constitutional in light of his vote in favor of access in the subsequent right-of-
access cases. Also, in his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980), Blackmun wrote that "the public has an intense need and a deserved right to
know about the administration ofjustice in general... ." Ia at 604. See also Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 412-13 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the impor-
tance of the traditional open access to trials and its role in a democracy). Surely, the public's
interest in the conduct of public officials involved in the criminal justice system does not end
once an individual who has been convicted of an offense passes through the prison gates.
51. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 27-29.
52. Id.
53. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
54. Id. at 580. The Court held that "the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people
have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could
be eviscerated.'" (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). Richmond Newspa-
pers, 448 U.S. at 580.
55. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573. The Court stated: "From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are
bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal
trial under our system of justice." Id.
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the Court traced back to "the days before the Norman Conquest."'5 6
The Court concluded that "[t]he right of access to places tradition-
ally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may be
such as assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment guaran-
tees of speech and press ........
The Court also recognized the structural role of the first amend-
ment guarantees in the proper functioning of the government.
Chief Justice Burger noted that the freedoms enumerated in the first
amendment "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of govern-
ment."58 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
[P]ublic access to trials acts as an important check, akin in pur-
pose to the other checks and balances that infuse our system of
government. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power, . . .
[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are insufficient.59
The Supreme Court once again relied on the factors of tradi-
tional openness and the structural role of the right of access to de-
cide the issue in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.60 In Globe,
the Court held unconstitutional, as violative of the first amendment,
a Massachusetts statute61 which barred the press and public during
the testimony of a minor in a sexual offense trial.62 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, stated the constitutional standard applied
56. IdL at 565; see also id. at 564-69 (the Court's discussion of the history of open trials).
57. Id at 577; see also id. at 582 (Stevens, 3., concurring) ("This is a watershed case.
Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of in-
formation or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy
matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever.").
58. Id at 575.
59. Id at 596; see also id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring) (public access to trials "serves
to assure the integrity of what goes on").
60. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
61. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
62. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 610-11. As to the structural role of the right of ac-
cess, the Court stated, "Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is
the common understanding that 'a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs,' Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). By offering
such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effec-
tively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government." Id. at 604.
See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30-32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stressing
that the core objective of the first amendment is preservation of a full and free flow of infor-
mation to the general public); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597-98
(1974) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("resolution of First Amendment public access claims in
individual cases must be strongly influenced by the weight of historical practice and by an
assessment of the specific structural value of public access in the circumstances."); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stressing "societal
19861
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in this case: "Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to
deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive
information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. 63
The right of access to information has arisen in a variety of con-
texts, from the right to travel in foreign nations" to the right to
hear the testimony in a sexual offense trial.65 Any general standard
adopted by the Supreme Court must be sufficiently flexible to deal
with such a wide variety of situations with differing degrees of re-
straint and governmental interests. One commentator, William
Van Alstyne,6 6 has suggested an alternative phrasing of the consti-
tutional standard in right-of-access cases.67 The question in each
case should be "whether the 'interference with access to important
information' represented by the decison to exclude is 'arbitrary' in
the ordinary first amendment sense of being inadequately justified
by sufficiently compelling, countervailing reasons, in light of the
scope of the access restriction."68
Both the Van Alstyne standard and the one adopted by the
Globe Court would require the government to show that its action
was necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest in or-
der to justify a complete denial of access. Under the Globe Court's
approach any interference less than a complete denial of access
would be subject to review under a less strict standard.69 The Van
Alstyne standard, however, implies that a varying judicial standard
function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental
affairs").
63. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606-07 (emphasis added). The Court in Globe found
the state's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is a
compelling one, but concluded that the complete exclusion of the public and the press was
overbroad to achieve that goal. This was because the Massachusetts statute required "closure
even if the victim does not seek the exclusion of the press and general public, and would not
suffer injury by their presence." Id. at 608. The Court reaffirmed Richmond and Globe in
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
64. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
66. William Van Alstyne is the Perkins Professor of Law at Duke University.
67. W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 55 (1984). For
an additional constitutional standard, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. W. VAN ALYSTYNE, supra note 67, at 55.
69. The Globe Court ruled that a total barring of reporters was a first amendment viola-
tion but stated that limitations which resemble "'time, place, and manner' restrictions ...
would not be subjected to such strict scrutiny." Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 607 n.17
(quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976)).
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should be applied depending on the level of governmental interfer-
ence with access to important information.
The attractiveness of the Van Alstyne standard is that it is flexi-
ble enough to permit the Court to weigh the public's first amend-
ment interests against the government's interests in light of the
practical exigencies of different situations. The proper weight to be
given to each interest will vary considerably, depending on the na-
ture of the information and the way the information would be ob-
tained. The more flexible standard would be especially well-suited
to the analysis of the complex problems that press access to overt
military operations poses.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO OVERT
MILITARY OPERATIONS
A. The Unbroken History of Press Access to Overt
Military Operations
In American history, the presence of war correspondents in the
battlefield is as old as the nation itself.70 Isaiah Thomas reported
the battle of Lexington in the May 3, 1775 issue of the Massachu-
setts Spy, after having fought with the militia against the British.71
The Mexican-American War of 1846-47 was reported by newsmen
who rode on horseback into battle with General Zachary Taylor.72
American war correspondents also reported from the battlefield in
the American Civil War,73 the Spanish-American War,74 and
70. M.L. STEIN, UNDER FIRE: THE STORY OF AMERICAN WAR CORRESPONDENTS 12-
13 (1968). But see Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right
of Access, Grenada, and "Off-the-Record Wars", 73 GEO. L.J. 931 (1985) (admitting that the
press has been allowed access to the front lines, but arguing that censorship and press embar-
goes evidence a broken history of press access to overt military operations).
71. See supra note 70. See generally B. FAY, NOTES ON THE AMERICAN PRESS AT THE
END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1927) (discussing the American press during the
American Revolutionary War and the late 1700's).
72. M.L. STEIN, supra note 70, at 13-14; see also F. BULLARD, FAMOUS WAR CORRE-
SPONDENTS 6, 351-74 (1914); R. DESMOND, THE PRESS AND WORLD AFFAIRS 17-21 (1937)
(discussing war correspondence during the Mexican-American War).
73. F. BULLARD, supra note 72, at 375-408; R. DESMOND, supra note 72, at 22; J.
HOHENBERG, FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE: THE GREAT REPORTERS AND THEIR TIMES
62-72 (1964); P. KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY 20-39 (1975); M.L. STEIN, supra note
70, at 14-32; Sears, The First News Blackout, AMERICAN HERITAGE, June-July 1985, at 24;
Middleton, Barring Reporters from the Battlefield, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984, (Magazine), at
36.
74. F. BULLARD, supra note 72, at 409-24; J. HOHENBERG, supra note 73, at 130-33; P.
KNIGHTLEY, supra note 73, at 130-38; M.L. STEIN, supra note 70, at 33-48.
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World War L"
American correspondents played a large role in keeping the
public informed of the events occurring in World War 11.76 Edward
Murrow gave Americans regular reports from England before the
United States entered the war." Five-hundred and fifty-eight
American reporters accompanied the allied forces on the D-Day in-
vasion of Normandy.7 8 A New York Times reporter flew in the Air
Force plane that dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki in 1945.' 9
Both the Korean80 and the Vietnamese81 wars were covered ex-
tensively by news correspondents. The extent of coverage during
the Vietnamese war is demonstrated by the fact that at least fifty-
three reporters were killed in Southeast Asia between 1961 and
1975.82
B. The Right of Access of the Press to Overt Military Operations
The right of access of the press to information regarding overt
military operations is different from other right-of-access cases in at
least three ways. First, the institutional framework of the govern-
ment, which in the foreign policy area places a large amount of
power in the hands of the executive branch, gives a unique role to
the press in its duty to keep the public informed.83 Second, the way
in which the executive branch has historically handled military op-
erations strongly suggests a critical role in our democratic system
75. J. HOHENBERG, supra note 73, at 202-43; P. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 73, at 79-135;
M.L. STEIN, supra note 70, at 60-78.
76. P. BRAESTRUP, supra note 2, at 27-45; J. HOHENBERG, supra note 73, at 332-84; P.
KNIGHTLEY, supra note 73, at 269-333; M.L. STEIN, supra note 70, at 93-148; Chancellor,
From Normandy to Grenada, AMERICAN HERITAGE, June-July 1985, at 32; Middleton, supra
note 73, at 36, 61.
77. J. HOHENBERG, supra note 73, at 336-37.
78. P. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 73, at 322.
79. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A26, col. 1.
80. P. BRAESTRUP, supra note 2, at 47-60; J. HOHENBERG, supra note 73, at 390-98; P.
KNIGHTLEY, supra note 73, at 335-56; M.L. STEIN, supra note 70, at 149-59.
81. P. BRAESTRUP, supra note 2, at 61-75; D. HALBERSTAM, THE PowERs THAT BE
445-534 (1979); J. HOHENBERG, supra note 73, at 446-49; P. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 73, at
373-425; D. RATHER, THE CAMERA NEVER BLINKS 195-214 (1977); M.L. STEIN, supra note
70, 160-76.
82. Weintraub, US. Press Curbs: The Unanswered Questions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29,
1983, at A7, col. 5 (cont. from page 1); Grenada - and Mount Suribachi, N.Y. Times, Oct.
28, 1983, at A26, col. 1.; see also Dudman, U.S. Newsman Freed in Cambodia Tells of 40-Day
Ordeal, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1970, at A2, col. 3 (report from Richard Dudman of the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch after his release by Vietnamese communists who held him and two other
American newsmen prisoner for six weeks).
83. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
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for the press as "watchdog" of the government.84 Finally, however,
it is in the areas of military operations and national security that the
government can legitimately claim a compelling interest in limiting
the access of the press to information.85
The term "national security" is by its very nature amorphous.
Few, if any, can argue that self-preservation is anything but the
most important governmental interest, yet there can be reasonable
disagreement about what must be done or not done to preserve our
national existence. Invocation of the term "national security" as a
justification for barring press access to overt military operations
may reflect important concerns which must be addressed, but may
also be an attempt to cover up activities which the government
wishes to keep hidden from the public.86
As Justice Black noted in his concurring opinion in New York
Times Co. v. United States,87 "[t]he word 'security' is a broad, vague
generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding
of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed repre-
sentative government provides no real security for our Republic." '88
The primary governmental interest which would allow the gov-
ernment to censor or limit press access to overt military operations
is in protecting the secrecy of information, which if released, would
jeopardize military success or endanger lives of United States mili-
tary personnel. Common examples of this type of information are
the sailing dates of transports and the location of troops.8 9 Beyond
these archetypical cases, however, the vagueness of national secur-
84. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
85. The Supreme Court has recognized national security as a compelling governmental
interest. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1980).
86. L. RIESELBACH, PEOPLE VS. GOVERNMENT: THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AMERICAN
INSTITUTIONS 228 (1975) ("The term national security has often been invoked to justify in-
creases in military appropriations, subordination of individual rights, and disregard of normal
constitutional processes.").
87. 403 U.S. 713 (1970).
88. Id, at 719; see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) ("The greater the
importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institu-
tions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitu-
tional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity
for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the
security of the Republic, the very foundation of consitutional government."). For a general
discussion of national security and a free press, see Note, National Security Interests vs. The
First Amendment: Haig v. Agee, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 1437 (1982).
89. See supra note 22.
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ity becomes evident, and the dangers inherent in the abuse of such a
strong governmental interest become clear.
The role of the press in informing the American people is espe-
cially critical in the context of the President acting within his con-
stitutional powers over foreign affairs and as Commander-in-
Chief.9° The constitutional checks on presidential power over for-
eign affairs are weak in practice, because the Congress 9t and the
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. In addition to the problem of deference, the governmental
check on the President's power is also inadequate because the President might not inform the
Congress about his actions as Commander-in-Chief. See, eg., Text of Goldwater's Letter to
Head of C.LA., N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at A9, col. 1 (letter from Sen. Barry Goldwater,
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to William J. Casey, Director of
Central Intelligence, angrily chastising Casey for not informing him of the American involve-
ment in the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors); Text of Moynihan Statement, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 16, 1984, at A8, col. 3 (Sen. Daniel Moynihan, issued the following statement in Wash-
ington, D.C., on April 15, 1984: "I have announced today that I will resign as Vice Chair-
man of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This appears to me the most emphatic
way I can express my view that the Senate committee was not properly briefed on the mining
of Nicaraguan harbors with American mines from an American ship under American com-
mand."). Two weeks later Sen. Moynihan withdrew his resignation after he received an apol-
ogy from Casey. Taubman, Moynihan To Keep Intelligence Post, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1984,
at Al, col. 5; Finney, President Assailed by Fulbright Panel, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1970, at Al,
col. 7 ("The Senate Foreign Relations Committee complained today that the Nixon adminis-
tration, by sending American troops into Cambodia 'without the consent or knowledge of
Congress' was usurping the war-making powers of Congress.").
In July 1965, five months after the United States had begun bombing North Vietnam,
President Lyndon Johnson was faced with a major decision about America's role in the Viet-
nam war. Then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara presented President Johnson with
three options: "to cut our losses and withdraw, to continue fighting at the current level, or to
substantially expand our military pressure .... Not surprisingly President Johnson chose
option No.3 .... Going to Congress meant, in effect, going to the nation with an announce-
ment of war, likely to be a long war, which would demand sacrifice on their part. The alter-
native strategy-which was Johnson's strategy-was to tell Congress and the public no more
than absolutely necessary." D. KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON & THE AMERICAN DREAM 281
(1976).
91. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("[B]ecause of the changeable and
explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact that the Executive is
immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and
acted upon by the legislature, Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of
foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields
in domestic areas."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936)
("Practically every volume of the United States Statutes contains one or more acts or joint
resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects affecting
foreign relations, which either leave the exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or
provide a standard far more general than that which has always been considered requisite
with regard to domestic affairs."). It is precisely this type of situation (the exclusion of the
press from overt military operations by the Executive) in which the Court should intervene,
despite its great reluctance, to preserve the press check on executive power because of the
inadequacy of any other means of maintaining presidential accountability. See also A.
THOMAS, THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 89-90 (1982) (discussing "con-
gressional acquiescence in presidential commitments" of armed forces); J. JAVrrS, WHO
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Court 92 consistently defer to the Chief Executive in recognition of
the President's special constitutional role in this area.
Although Congress has the sole power to declare war,9 3 this has
never prevented presidents from using military force against foreign
nations. 4 In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution"
over the veto of President Richard Nixon96 in an attempt to check
the President's power, but this measure's effectiveness is in doubt.97
MAKES WAR-THE PRESIDENT VERSUS CONGRESS 267 (1973) ("Over the past ten years we
have been forced to confront the fact that constitutional process has eroded, that congres-
sional responsibility has been abdicated, that unfettered presidential power has been asserted
and that it's time to call a halt.").
92. See, eg., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) ("Matters intimately related to
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.").
93. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
94. A. THoMAS, supra note 91, at 36-37 ("The Constitution of the United States grants
to the Congress with precision and with clarity the power to declare war. Thus it seems
somewhat anomalous that from the beginning of the nation's history presidential power to
use armed force against a foreign nation or nations has been exercised with no such declara-
tion or indeed without congressional authorization of any kind.") (footnotes omitted); see also
A. THOMAS, supra note 91, at 9-30 (discussing presidential assertions of military force since
1789); E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 110-60 (1982) (discussing the Vietnam war). See
generally Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balances--The Claim of an Unlimited
Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 213 (1983) (urging the restoration of a con-
gressional role in the war-making process).
95. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
96. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1285 (Oct. 24,
1973).
97. Leigh, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise, in
CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY 165, 169 (1984) (from American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security conference held May 10-11,
1984); see also Moore, The War Powers Resolution ... of Doubtful Constitutionality, 70
A.B.A. J. 10 (Mar. 1984) (recommending implementation of a panel to reach compromise
between Congress and executive branch on War Powers Resolution dispute); Turner, The
War Powers Resolution Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unhelpful, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
683 (1984) (urging repeal of the War Powers Resolution); Note, The Conduct of United States
Foreign Policy After Chadha- Upsetting a Critical Balance of Power, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L
L. 79 (1985). Every President since Franklin Roosevelt has expressed the view that the legis-
lative veto is an unconstitutional restriction on the executive's power. A. THOMAS, supra
note 92, at 135; see also Roberts, Democrats to Move on War Powers Act, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1983, at AIS, col. 1 ("Mr. Reagan, like other Presidents in the 10-year history of the War
Powers Resolution, has insisted that the law cannot tie his hands as Commander in Chief.").
On October 26, 1983, the House and Senate approved a joint resolution invoking the 60-day
limit on the use of American troops in Grenada which would presumably have required the
President to withdraw the troops after that time, unless Congress approved an extension. S.J.
Res. 186, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 14,694-95 (1983); H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 5,187 (1983). President Reagan promptly announced his
belief that the time limit places an unconstitutional restriction on his power as Commander-
in-Chief. Roberts, House Votes Bill Applying War Law to Grenada Moves, N.Y. Times, Nov.
2, 1983, at A16, col. 6. Moreover, the Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), which in part invalidated the use of the legislative veto, makes the validity of the War
Powers Resolution questionable at best.
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Although Congress theoretically could withdraw financial support
for military actions,98 it is unlikely to do so.99 In the absence of
effective congressional restraint on presidential power, the "watch-
dog" role of the press becomes an extremely important means of
limiting presidential discretion.lco
The Supreme Court has recognized this institutional deference
and the resultant, heightened importance of the press. In New
York Times Co. v. United States, °11 Justice Black wrote of the vital
role of the press in checking executive power over foreign affairs:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free
press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our
democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the gover-
nors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished
so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Gov-
ernment. The press was protected so that it could bare the
secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in govern-
ment. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press
is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign
fevers and foreign shot and shell. 102
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion,10 3 concluded that the
press is the sole means for making the government accountable to
the people in the area of foreign affairs:
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present
in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint
98. L. RIESELBACH, supra note 86, at 246 ("[The power of the purse] restriction has
been avoided by simply going through the motions of a yearly budget process which in fact
permits long-term outlays for the military. Congress' power over appropriations has also
failed to provide much check upon military budgetary autonomy. The military, especially
since the Second World War, has developed its own power base within Congress, and, with
some notable exceptions, has been able to obtain appropriations from Congress without con-
comitant limitations and controls.").
99. See, eg., Finney, Stennis Says U.S. May Have to Ease Curb in Cambodia, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1971, at Al, col. 8 (Sen. John Stennis, then chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, told reporters that if the Department of Defense and President Nixon
were to decide that the military situation in Cambodia required a larger United States com-
mitment, the Senate would relax restrictions attached to a military aid bill which prohibited
the introduction of ground combat troops or military advisors into Cambodia). For an analy-
sis of Congress' attempt to end the Vietnam war by withdrawing financial support, see R.
NIXON, THa MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 887-89 (1978); A. THOMAS, supra note 91, at
119-27.
100. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
101. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (the United States cannot enjoin publication of
certain classified materials-the Pentagon Papers).
102. Id. at 717.
103. Id. at 728.
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upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense
and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in
an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here
protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it
is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most
vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For
without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlight-
ened people. 4
Presidents have been and will be willing to commit American
troops without congressional approval 0 5 in military operations for
purposes that, once analyzed in the forum of public debate, might
well be considered by reasonable people to be improper. The Presi-
dent must be made especially accountable to the American people
for his use of power in this area. Without the presence of members
of the press as independent observers at overt military operations,
the most important check on executive power in this area is missing.
Without complete and accurate information from sources other
than interested participants, it would be virtually impossible for the
American people, or even Congress, to make informed decisions re-
garding the nation's foreign policy.106 The absence of the press
could enable the President to present the news in a manner which
would rally public support based on half-truths and deceptions.
10 7
Eventually, the "real" facts would surface. By that time, however,
the nation might be so deeply involved that withdrawal of troops
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. A. THOMAS, supra note 91, at 119 ("Truman continued to base his actions [in the
Korean war] upon his total constitutional powers, including his power as President to enforce
our international treaty obligations; and his successors in office, Eisenhower, Kennedy, John-
son, and Nixon, all apparently adopted his stance, sending troops into combat generally prior
to either a direct or even an indirect congressional approval.") (footnote omitted); see also
supra note 97 (discussing presidential resistance to congressional veto of executive war-mak-
ing actions).
106. If the American people, acting under incomplete and possibly inaccurate informa-
tion, express support for the military involvement, few Congressmen would be able to ignore
political realities and vote against the President.
107. One of the so-called "lessons of Vietnam" is that an unpopular war cannot be won
and should never be fought. Halloran, U.S. Will Not Drift Into a Latin War, Weinberger
Says, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1984, at A4, col. 3 (cont. from page 1) (listing six tests developed
by Secretary Weinberger to be applied by the President before committing United States
forces in combat, one of them being: "Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there
must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people .. "
Defense Department officials told reporters that Weinberger developed the tests after reading
the history of the Vietnam war and other conflicts.); Specter, Learning "Lesson"From Viet-
nam, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY 83 (1984) ("I believe that a
bitter lesson which was learned from Vietnam is the impossibility-impracticality-of fight-
ing a war without the support of the American people."); War's Lessons Struck Home: Na-
tionIs Support Crucial on Distant Battlefields, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1985, § 1, at 9, col. 2.
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would arguably dishonor those who had already fought and those
who had been killed, leading to pressure to prolong the use of mili-
tary force.'0 8
III. THE UNPRECEDENTED EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS FROM
AN OVERT MILITARY OPERATION
A. The Invasion of Grenada
From dawn on October 25, 1983, until the afternoon of October
27, 1983, United States military personnel carried out an invasion of
foreign territory without the presence of American news reporters
as independent observers. 09 It was the first time in American his-
tory that reporters had been barred from observing overt operations
of the United States military. 110 On the night before the invasion,
Larry Speakes, White House deputy press secretary, in response to
requests for confirmation of reports of an imminent invasion, told
reporters that such reports were "preposterous."'' 11
Seven journalists charted a fishing boat to take them to Gre-
nada.11 2 Three of them accepted the offer of a helicopter escort to
the USS. Guam, from which they believed they would be permit-
ted to file their stories. 13 Instead, they were not permitted to con-
tact their editors and were held on board the Guam until the
108. Letter from President Nixon to author (May 2, 1972) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review) ("I want you to know that we are doing everything within our power
to obtain a lasting peace-a peace that will be worthy of the courage and sacrifice of those
who have fought, and a peace that will insure that your generation will never have to fight in
any war at all.").
109. Farrell, U.S. Allows 15 Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1983, at A13, col. 5.
110. Chancellor, From Normandy to Grenada, AMERICAN HERITAGE, June-July 1985, at
32; Keeping the Press from the Action, TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 65; Landau, Excluding the Press
from the Grenada Invasion: A Violation of the Public's Constitutional Rights, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, Dec. 10, 1983, at 10; Sears, The First News Blackout, AMERICAN HERITAGE, June-
July 1985, at 24; Middleton, Barring Reporters from the Battlefield, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984
(Magazine), at 36; Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1984, at Alo,
col. 1; Burnham, Curbs on Grenada News Coverage Criticized in House Hearing, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 1983, at A21, col. 1; Gailey, US. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action; News Groups
Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
111. Friendly, Weinberger Tied to Curb on Press, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, at A19, col.
1. Apparently, Speakes had not been informed in advance of the invasion, and later ex-
pressed anger that his credibility had been damaged. Keeping the Press from the Action,
TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 65; Roper, D.C. Press Corps 'Brawl' with White House, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Nov. 5, 1983, at 11.
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afternoon of October 27, when they were escorted to Grenada.' 14
Other members of the press attempted to reach Grenada by boat,
but turned back when United States forces began firing at them."'
Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, commander of the task force
which conducted the invasion, was quoted as saying: "I know how
to stop those press boats. We've been shooting at them. We haven't
sunk any yet, but how are we to know who's on them?""' 6
When journalists were finally allowed to travel to Grenada on
October 27, many problems hampered their ability to obtain and
disseminate the news.' For the first week, the press was permitted
only limited access to the island." 8 Reporters were escorted contin-
uously by military personnel and were permitted to remain on the
island for only short periods." 9 No live television transmissions
were permitted, and stories could only be filed several hours later
from nearby Barbados.' 20
Press briefings by military officers in Barbados consisted primar-
ily of shortened versions of reports already released to reporters in
Washington, D.C. 2' Some of the information provided by the mili-
tary was misleading or false. Admiral Metcalf first told reporters
that Bernard Coard, the Deputy Prime Minister of Grenada be-
lieved to have been involved in the overthrow of Maurice Bishop,
had been detained by Grenadians.' 22 When a marine officer told
the press that United States marines had in fact captured and de-
tained Coard, Admiral Metcalf then said to reporters asking for a
clarification: "O.K. Let's be technical."' 23 Several more serious in-
stances of incomplete information and false statements further an-
gered the press. 124
The United States government initially inflated the number of
114. Id.; Keeping the Press from the Action, TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 65.
115. Admiral Says It Was His Decision to Tether the Press, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at
A12, col. 3.
116. Id.
117. Feron, Covering Grenada: Host of Problems, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at A5, col.
1.
118. Hunter, U.S. Eases Restrictions on Coverage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at A12, col.
1.
119. Idl
120. Id.; An Off-the-Record War, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1983, at 83.
121. Feron, Covering Grenada: Host of Problems, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at A5, col. 1.
122. Admiral Says It Was His Decision to Tether the Press, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at
A12, col. 3.
123. Id
124. An Autopsy of an Invasion, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 14, 1983, at 28; Taylor, In Wake of
Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by US. Comes to Light, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at
A20, col. 1; Military v. Press: Troubled History, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. I.
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Cuban military personnel in Grenada and concealed several mis-
haps which caused the deaths of Grenadians and United States mili-
tary personnel. 2 ' The inadvertent bombing of a civilian mental
hospital, which killed at least seventeen persons, was not reported
for six days.' 2 6 President Reagan declared the invasion a "rescue
mission," '127 but the airport on Grenada had been open on the day
before the invasion, and some Americans had left and others could
have, if they had chosen to.'28 Charles R. Modica, chancellor of the
medical school on Grenada, where most of the Americans were lo-
cated, stated that the invasion was "very unnecessary" to save
American lives. 1
29
Press reaction to the exclusion of reporters from the initial days
of the invasion and the subsequent limits on coverage throughout
the first week was rapid and intensely critical. 131 Anthony
Lewis,' in a column in the New York Times, wrote: "The Ameri-
can people needed light on [important] questions from the start to
enable them to perform their duty of critical judgment on official
policy. But Mr. Reagan did not want the inconvenience of demo-
cratic judgment. He wanted unrestrained power. Hence his great
effort to keep the public in powerless ignorance." 132
John Chancellor of NBC News said: "The Reagan Administra-
tion has produced a bureaucrat's dream .... Do anything, no one
125. Taylor, In Wake of Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by U.S. Comes to Light,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 1.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
128. Clines, A Reagan Press Official Resigns Over Grenada, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at
A17, col. 1; Smith, Ex-US. Official Cites Ease in Leaving Grenada Day Before Invasion, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 3 ("The former director of President Reagan's National
Commission on Social Security said today [Oct. 28] that he flew out of Grenada on a
chartered plane last Monday [Oct. 24], a day on which the White House contended that it
could not evacuate Americans because the Grenadian international airport was closed.").
129. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A20, col. 5.
130. Radolf, News Organizations Protest Grenada Restrictions, EDrrOR & PUBLISHER,
Nov. 5, 1983, at 14; Friendly, Press Voices Criticism of 'Off-the-Record War, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1983, at A16, col. 1; Gailey, U.S. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action; News Groups
Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
Publisher Larry Flynt filed a lawsuit against Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
claiming the press exclusion was unconstitutional and seeking a declaratory judgment and an
injunction ordering that the press be permitted access to Grenada. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762
F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The court of appeals held that the action was moot
because the administration began to permit some limited access two days after the complaint
was filed.
131. Anthony Lewis is an editorial columnist for the New York Times.
132. Lewis, What Was He Hiding?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at A19, col. 5.
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is watching."' 3 3 Walter Cronkite, former CBS News anchorman,
said: "This nation is founded on the belief that people have the
right to know and that we participate in our Government's actions
.... These are our marines, our Rangers down there. This is our
foreign policy and we have a right to know precisely what is hap-
pening, and there can be no excuse in denying the people that
right."' 134
Columnists and editorial writers protested the treatment of the
press and called for the administration to abandon its new policy of
press exclusion. 135 The high level of press criticism of the news
blackout prompted the House Committee on the Judiciary's Sub-
committee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice to hold hearings on the press exclusion. 136 The United
States Senate adopted an amendment to a debt limit bill declaring
that "restrictions imposed on the press in Grenada shall cease."' 137
The administration eventually lessened the restrictions and allowed
reporters limited access to the island. 138 However, by that time, the
military operations had been completed, and the United States had
control of the island.
B. Who Should Determine the Limits of Press Access to Overt
Military Operations?
Determination of the limits of press access to overt military op-
erations requires careful consideration of the first amendment inter-
ests involved. Therefore, the issue of who should make this decision
is critical.
It is difficult to determine conclusively who made the decision to
exclude the news media from the invasion of Grenada, but several
persons have been credited with having made it. Deputy Secretary
of State Kenneth W. Dam told members of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee that the press had been excluded based on advice
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the security of the reporters could
133. Farrell, U.S. Allows 15 Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1983, at A13, col. 5.
134. Id,
135. Wall, '1984' Looms Ahead, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 16, 1985, at 1035.
136. 129 CONG. REC. D1452 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1983); Burnham, Curbs on Grenada News
Coverage Criticized in House Hearing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, at A21, col. 1.
137. 129 CONG. Rc. S14991 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1983); Hunter, US. Eases Restrictions on
Coverage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at A12, col. 1.
138. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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not be guaranteed. 139 In Barbados on October 29 (four days after
the invasion began), Admiral Metcalf told reporters that it was his
decision to keep the press out of Grenada."4 Admiral Metcalf later
told reporters that part of the reason that journalists were excluded
was "many of his fellow officers harbored a strong dislike of the
media." 14
1
At a news conference on October 26, Secretary of Defense Cas-
par W. Weinberger said that the decision to exclude the press was
made by military commanders in the field and that he would not
overrule their decision. 42 On November 1, 1983, the New York
Times reported that on the night before the invasion, officials from
the Pentagon and the State Department met to discuss the adminis-
tration's policy with respect to news coverage of the invasion. It
was reported that the officials decided that the military should en-
force a news blackout. 143
However, on November 13, the New York Times reported that
Pentagon spokesman Michael I. Burch told reporters that Secretary
Weinberger had decided to exclude the press.'" In spite of the con-
139. 129 CONG. REc. D1400 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1983); Farrell, U.S. Allows 15 Reporters
To Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A13, col. 5.
140. Media Curbed Out of Dislike, Admiral Says, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1983, § 1, at 10,
col. 1.
Admiral Metcalf received a letter of caution from the Pentagon for trying to bring 24
captured AK-47 rifles back from Grenada, in violation of federal law, to pass out as souve-
nirs. Pentagon Plans New Inquiry On Admiral's Grenada Arms, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1985, at
A3, col. 6; Keller, For Admiral, Warning; for G.Ls, Jail, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1985, at A5,
col. 3. Admiral Metcalf's apparent ignorance of federal laws regarding importation of weap-
ons suggests that he should not be trusted to make the decision about press access to military
operations.
141. Media Curbed Out of Dislike, Admiral Says, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1983, § 1, at 10,
col. 1. But see Watkins, The Media and the Military-To See the World As It Is, VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Vol. L, at 199 (Jan. 15, 1984); A. HAIG, CAVEAT: REALISM, REA-
GAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY 357 (1984) ("Our foreign policy must reflect the values of the
nation. Military power and economic strength are important, but they are not everything.
Americans will support a policy that demands a world of peaceful change, the defense of
human values, the liberation of human genius, and the advancement of social justice. The
world will believe in an America that defends these values and asks other nations to share the
burden and the promise of defending them."); (Watkins, United States Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, in speaking for the military, stated: "The fact is we would die, and some of our people
have died, to protect first amendment rights which some say we ignore. Our belief in freedom
is what separates us from some of our potential enemies. We all know that.") (emphasis in
original).
142. Gailey, U.S. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action; News Groups Protest, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 27, 1983, at A12, col. 6.
143. Clines, A Reagan Press Official Resigns Over Grenada, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at
A17, col. 1.
144. Friendly, Weinberger Tied to Curb on Press, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, at A19, col.
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tradictory statements by government officials about the source of
the decision to bar the press, the exclusion during the invasion of
Grenada establishes a clear pattern of news management by the
Reagan administration.
In a debate held on December 15, 1983, Richard Willard, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General, said:
The courts are now unwilling to impose, except in very drastic
situations, any kind of prior restraint on the press or to permit
the government to do so. The only way the government can keep
the press from jeopardizing national security is to keep them
from learning national security information in the first place.
That is firmly embedded now in First Amendment jurisprudence
as a result of the absolutism of such people as Mr. [Floyd]
Abrams.[ 145] And we have to live with that. But the way we live
with it is to keep the press from finding it out in the first place
146
Willard's statement of the Reagan administration's policy of secrecy
suggests that the decision to exclude the press from the invasion of
Grenada was a calculated policy decision at high levels rather than
a decision made by a military commander in the field.
The press has written extensively about the Reagan administra-
tion's manipulation of the flow of governmental information. In a
1982 Columbia Journalism Review article written by a research as-
sociate for the Center for National Security, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the Reagan administration were accused of plac-
ing "unprecedented restrictions on press access to intelligence infor-
mation [while being] at least as willing as past administrations to
use leaks and selective declassification to support its foreign pol-
icy.")1 47 The Reagan administration has seemingly placed a high
priority on controlling and manipulating the amount and content of
information which reaches the American public.14
145. Abrams is an attorney specializing in the first amendment.
146. National Security and the First Amendment, ABA Standing Comm. on Law and
Nat'l Security 24 (1984) (transcript of a debate held on Dec. 15, 1983).
147. Peterzell, The Government Shuts Up-The Reagan Administration Is Stonewalling
Reporters on the Intelligence Beat-Except, of Course, When Leaks Serve Its Purposes,
COLUM. JOURNALISM Rv., July-Aug. 1982, at 31. The Center for National Security Studies
is a Washington-based organization funded by the American Civil Liberties Union and The
Fund for Peace.
148. See, eg., infra text accompanying note 150 (accusing Reagan administration of un-
precedented exclusion of press to governmental information).
In April 1982, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874
(1982), which, among other things, allows the CIA to reclassify any material it deems sensi-
tive, even if the information has already been published and widely circulated. See also Hitt,
Warning: CIA Censors at Work, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 1984, at 44 (discuss-
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In the March-April 1985 issue of the Columbia Journalism Re-
view, Anthony Marro, managing editor of Newsday, wrote an in-
depth history of how presidents since Dwight Eisenhower have used
deception, half-truths and known falsehoods to manipulate the flow
of information about governmental affairs. 49 Marro found that the
Reagan administration has done more than any recent administra-
tion to "bottle up information, to prevent public access to govern-
mental officials and records, to threaten and intimidate the
bureaucracy in order to dry up sources of information, and to pre-
vent the press and the public from learning how their government is
functioning."15 To support his argument, Marro noted that during
the invasion of Grenada President Reagan and Pentagon camer-
amen showed the American public warehouses stacked full of arma-
ments that President Reagan said would have armed thousands of
ing how the CIA's censorship program is selectively applied to serve the government's needs
and suggesting that Reagan's order will be similarly applied).
The Reagan administration has also made it more difficult for the press to obtain informa-
tion under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
FOIA]. For example, Executive Order No. 12,356, supra, designated more information as
classified. In addition, the Reagan administration has used several techniques to obstruct the
use of the FOIA. According to an article written by the executive director of Investigative
Reporters and Editors, bureaucrats have charged fees without justification, then refused to
act on the request until the money is paid for information which might turn out to be of little
or no value or never released. Bureaucrats have also failed to respond to requests for infor-
mation within the time mandated by law, intentionally understaffed FOIA offices citing fiscal
restraint, forced expensive, time-consuming court cases, transferred documents to other of-
fices within the same agency or to other agencies without informing the requester, and have
interpreted the nine exemptions so broadly that the exemptions leave little or no force to the
rule. Weinberg, Trashing the FOIA-How Bureaucrats Have Been Licensed to Thwart the
Intent of Congress-and Drive Reporters Up the Wall, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb.
1985, at 21.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press assembled a list of 51 executive acts
made by the Reagan administration since March 1981, in an attempt to severely limit access
to information. The list cites invasions of editorial privacy, restrictions on access to govern-
mental information, and instances of prior restraint. Reporters Committee Raps Reagan Ad-
ministration, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 6, 1985, at 12.
Another list of the Reagan administration's actions to limit free public debate about gov-
ernmental affairs was published in THE NATION. Sheinfeld, Four More Years of Secrecy-
Washington vs. The Right to Know, THE NATION, Apr. 13, 1985, at 426. The Article, written
by an attorney and associate professor of journalism, accused the Reagan administration of
"[u]sing secrecy, censorship and sleek propaganda to protect itself from public scrutiny and
criticism ... to achieve its goals without justifying them in debate." Id.
As the NATION Article points out, the frustration of the press with the Reagan adminis-
tration's restrictions must be turned into positive energy in order to create means of forcing
the administration to be more open about information (admittedly a difficult task) or to ob-
tain governmental information in other ways.
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terrorists. When reporters from the American news media later
went to the warehouses they found some of them half-empty, some
of them filled with cases of sardines and many of the weapons
antiquated.'5s
Marro concluded that the press will have to become more ag-
gressive and follow the advice of former Attorney General John
Mitchell who said, "Watch what we do instead of what we say.' 52
It is not sufficient merely to criticize the Reagan administration for
its policy of secrecy and sophisticated news management. Members
of the press must make it their responsibility to counteract efforts to
stifle public debate about governmental activities, particularly activ-
ities like the invasion of Grenada.
C. The Reasons Advanced by the Reagan Administration for
Excluding the Press from the Invasion of Grenada
The Reagan administration cited three primary reasons for de-
nying the press access to the island of Grenada during the first days
of the October, 1983 invasion. Considering the long history of press
access to overt military operations, it is unclear how any of the ra-
tionales offered by the administration distinguish this invasion from
all previous overt military operations.
The initial justification cited by Secretary Weinberger was that
he did not want to "second-guess our commanders in the field."' 53
As pointed out by an editorial in the New York Times, which
quoted Secretary Weinberger as saying he "wouldn't ever dream of
overriding a commander's decision," '54 this justification is incon-
sistent with the theory of civilian control of the military.' The
151. Id at 39.
152. Id at 33, 41. Additionally, Marro urges reporters to personally contact people af-
fected by governmental action to see if what they say has happened to them coincides with
what the administration maintains is the result of its action. Id. at 39. Other suggestions
include checking official documents personally instead of accepting the administration's sum-
mary of their contents and checking official records to confirm numbers provided by adminis-
tration officials. Id at 40.
153. Saire, Two-Front Peace, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A31, col. 5. Additionally, it
should be noted that there was sufficient time for the Reagan administration to include the
press in its plans for the invasion. Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was killed on
October 19, 1983. According to Secretary Shultz, the President ordered naval ships into the
area on October 20, 1983, and by October 23 had made a tentative decision to respond to the
urgent request for help from the O.E.C.S. Transcript of Shultz's News Conference on Why
US. Acted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at AI8, col. 1.
154. Grenada - and Mount Suribachi, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A26, col. 1.
155. W. BINKLEY, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLrIcs 662 (1951) ("Towering above
all other considerations in charting national defense policies is one cardinal principle: the
supreme control must remain in civilian hands."); see also comments of Sen. Kennedy supra
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military, some of whom admit that antagonism toward the press
exists among its members, 5 6 cannot be permitted to possess com-
plete discretionary power to exclude the press from overt opera-
tions. The public would be left ill-informed, misinformed, or even
ignorant of governmental and military activities about which it has
a right to be fully and accurately informed.
The second reason for denial of access advanced by Secretary
Weinberger was that the military could not guarantee reporters
"any kind of safety." '57 This statement betrays a lack of under-
standing of the history of American war correspondence. News re-
porters have always accepted the danger that comes with being at
the scene of breaking news events. 158 War correspondents, no less
than soldiers, are willing to jeopardize their own safety to fulfill
their responsibilities. As long as American reporters have been cov-
ering military operations from the front lines, they have been dying
on the front lines as well.15 9 When the Secretary of Defense at-
tempted to justify the exclusion of the press from Grenada because
the reporters' safety could not be guaranteed, he dishonored the
hundreds of dedicated and courageous men and women who were
wounded or killed while covering the news from battlefields all over
the world.1 60
The third rationale cited for excluding the press was military
necessity or "national security." The primary concern articulated
by General John W. Vessey, Jr., former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was the need for surprise.161 This is, of course, a
compelling reason for prohibiting the dissemination of information
about an imminent attack, but it is not a legitimate justification for
barring reporters completely. President Reagan announced the in-
vasion himself only four hours after it began on October 25.162 Re-
porters recognize the sensitivity of information which would
note 5 (refusing to cede civilian control over the military); L. RIESELBACH, supra note 86, at
235 ("The concept of civilian control of the military envisions that the military should only
execute orders to engage in hostilities, that it should neither decide when nor how force will
be used nor question an order from the appropriate civilian authority to use force.").
156. Media Curbed Out of Dislike, Admiral Says, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1983, § 1, at 10,
col. I; see also Military vs Press: Troubled History, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 1
(tracing the Reagan administration's restrictions on news coverage of the invasion of Gre-
nada to the military's resentment about media coverage of the Vietnam War).
157. Grenada - and Mount Suribachi, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A26, col. 1.
158. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
159. Id
160. Id.
161. Grenada - and Mount Suribachi, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A26, col. 1.
162. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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jeopardize military operations and have submitted to wartime cen-
sorship and news embargoes when necessary for the security of mili-
tary operations. 163 The justification of the need for surprise no
longer made sense after the invasion had begun and President Rea-
gan announced it to the world.
Additionally, the exclusion of American news reporters could
not have ensured total surprise because Radio Free Grenada had
broadcast mobilization orders on the two days before the invasion
began. 16 The forces which resisted the American invasion had ap-
parently been expecting military intervention. In addition, Ameri-
can ham radio operators living on the island broadcast reports of
the invasion soon after it began. 165 The press exclusion did not keep
the operation secret from anyone but the American people.
The press exclusion was not only insufficient to meet the objec-
tive of secrecy, but it was also an unnecessary measure. A small
group of reporters could have been transported to Grenada with
little danger of jeopardizing the invasion. Members of the news me-
dia have been willing to accept some restrictions on dissemination
of sensitive information at the commencement of a military opera-
tion in exchange for access to it. 16 6 The critical first amendment
concern is the presence of independent observers rather than the
immediate dissemination of sensitive military information at the
outset of a military operation.
The constitutional right of access has arisen in several different
situations. In each case the Court has looked to the competing in-
terests involved and determined the degree of access which is con-
stitutionally necessary. 67 The right of access of the press to
criminal trials is extensive,"' while the right of access to prisons islimited to a greater degree. 169 Therefore, in order to find the appro-
163. R. DESMOND, supra note 72, at 138-54; P. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 73, at 119, 307-
08, 345-51, 375-83; F. THAYER, supra note 32, at 43-46.
164. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A17, col. 3 (cont. from page 1).
165. Under Fire, Ham Radio Operations Describe Invasion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at
A20, col. 2.
166. Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1984, at A10, col. 1.
(American Newpaper Publishers Association, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Asso-
ciated Press Managing Editors, National Association of Broadcasters, Radio-Television
News Directors Association, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists, The Associated Press, United Press International) ("Mission security
and troop safety interests have been protected-when essential-.. . by voluntary reporting
restraints.").
167. See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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priate level of access of the press to overt military operations, the
courts must take each of the competing interests involved, and
reach a conclusion which recognizes the value of both sides of the
issue. Such a conclusion, while permitting access of the press to
military operations, must be consonant with the compelling govern-
mental interest in the safety of Americans troops. One compromise
solution which seems to meet this strict criteria is the press pool.
IV. A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO MEDIA
MILITARY RELATIONS
The use of press pools to cover news events where logistical
problems prohibit access by large numbers of reporters is not new.
Press pools have been used in covering political conventions, presi-
dential debates, and courtroom trials, among other situations.
More importantly, the press pool was recommended as a solution to
the problem of press access to overt military operations by a panel
of military officials and journalists commissioned by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to study this issue.
The panel, the Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle panel),
was chaired by Major General Winant Sidle, United States Army,
Retired. 70 Although invited by General Sidle to join the panel, the
major "umbrella" media organizations chose not to join as mem-
bers of a governmental panel, but instead to appear as witnesses and
submit written responses to questions prepared by the panel. 71
In a letter to General Vessey submitted with the panel's report,
General Sidle stated that the panel did not address "the matter of
so-called First Amendment rights," but would leave that to the
legal profession and the courts. General Sidle did state in the let-
ter, however, that "the U.S. media should cover U.S. military oper-
ations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission
security and the safety of U.S. forces." '172
The panel's final report consists of eight recommendations
which include the use of "the largest possible press pool that is
practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary
before 'full coverage' is feasible." '173 The primary focus of the re-
port was to encourage the military to plan for media access concur-
170. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Media Relations Panel, Report to General
John W. Vessey, Jr., Enclosure 1 [hereinafter cited as Sidle Panel Report].
171. Id. at Introduction.
172. Letter from Gen. Sidle to Gen. Vessey (undated) (accompanying submission of Sidle
Panel Report, supra note 170).
173. Sidle Panel Report, supra note 170, at 4.
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rently with the planning of military operations. 174  The panel
recognized that without better understanding between the military
and the media, problems like those which occurred during the Gre-
nada invasion would likely recur. 175
The press responses to the Sidle panel's questions generally
agreed that in the rare circumstances when "transportation, secur-
ity or other factors make full coverage impossible,"' 1 76 pool coverage
may be a necessary measure. But they also generally agreed that
pool coverage should last only as long as is necessary and should be
replaced by full access as soon as possible. 17 7
Although concurring in the use of press pools when necessary,
the Cable News Network (CNN) offered several criticisms of press
pools in general. CNN argued that it would prefer not to rely on
reports from press pools, because of its probable unfamiliarity with
the pool members, reporters over whom it has no control.17  It also
noted that pool coverage eliminates the diversity of news sources,
which is a necessary component of a free press. 179 Another problem
is that because pool schemes generally envision a rotation system,
reporters would not be able to build the experience and knowledge
necessary to adequately cover the operations or to establish valuable
relationships with sources.180 Despite these problems, however,
the use of a press pool, when necessary, is apparently the best solu-
tion to a difficult problem.
Once it is agreed that full press access is not possible and that a
press pool will be used, it must next be decided what the structure
of the pool arrangement will be, and who should determine that
structure. Because of the large number of newspapers, magazines,
radio stations, television networks and wire services which would
desire to be represented in any pool arrangement, some type of rota-
tion system seems to be the only workable solution. The size of the
pool would be dictated by the circumstances in each case. Assum-
ing a pool of approximately ten members, one possible composition
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5-6 (see recommendation eight).
176. Response of the National Association of Broadcasters to inquiries from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 27, 1984) at 2.
177. See, e.g., response of the American Newspaper Publishers Association to inquiries
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 11, 1984) at 3 ("Media access provided by the government
in any instance should be the maximum amount possible at the earliest possible time consis-
tent with mission security and troop safety.").
178. Response of the Cable News Network to inquiries from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Jan. 27, 1984) at 2-3.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id.
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of the pool would include a representative of at least two major
national newspapers, one news magazine, two still photographers,
three television cameramen and sound crew, and two wire service
reporters.
The issue of whether pool members should be accredited by the
Pentagon is still being debated.181 The military wants trustworthy
reporters belonging to the pool, 18 2 but the news media fear that ac-
creditation would turn into licensing.18 3 The news media want to
prevent the military from excluding individual reporters who the
military believes are too critical. 84
As the pool arrangement currently operates, certain news orga-
nizations are notified by the Pentagon that they might be asked to
supply a reporter to the pool.185 When the pool is to be activated,
the Pentagon selects the news organizations which are to partici-
pate. 18 6 Each news organization is to identify for the Pentagon two
reporters. 87 The Pentagon then chooses one of these nominees. 88
181. See, e.g., response of NEWSWEEK to inquiries from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan.
24, 1984) ("We would have no objection to an accreditation system, similar to that now in
force for press access to the White House, being adopted for short-notice coverage of military
operations."); response of the National Association of Broadcasters to inquiries from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 27, 1984) ("A news organization's and its reporters' regular press
credentials should suffice for coverage of military operations.").
182. See Sidle Panel Report, supra note 170, at app. (news briefing by Michael Burch,
Assistant Secretary of Defense, held on August 23, 1984) ("I must empahasize the need for
security of the mission and the safety of our forces. We must be able to work with people and
news organizations who respect those two very important criteria.").
183. See, eg., response of the Associated Press to inquiries from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Jan. 23, 1984) ("The danger here is that [a] fine line [exists] between accreditation and li-
cense."); response of the American Newspaper Publishers Association to inquiries from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 11, 1984) ("Accreditation should not be construed as a licensing
process whereby only those accredited/licensed would ever be allowed to cover U.S. military
operations.").
184. See, eg., response of NEWSWEEK to inquiries from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 24,
1984) ("We would have very strong objections if it apeared that the accreditation process
were being used to try to affect the coverage-in other words, if certain correspondents were
blackballed because of what they had written in the past.").
185. See, eg., Memorandum from Robert L. Burke, Vice President, Industry and Public
Affairs, American Newspaper Publishers Association, to Steve Green, Managing Editor,
Copley Press (June 6, 1985) (describing a meeting with Michael Burch who discussed pool
procedures with those newspapers most likely to be involved in the next press pool activation)
and attached memorandum detailing Department of Defense requirements for pool
arrangement.
186. Id.; see also Mohr, The Continuing Battle Over Covering Wars, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1984, at A24, col. 3 (quoting Michael Burch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Af-
fairs, as saying that the people to serve in the pool, as well as the particular news agencies
selected, would be "more or less" selected by the Pentagon).
187. See Memorandum from Robert L. Burke, supra note 185.
188. Id.
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The Pentagon has carried out two tests of the pool arrangement
as recommended by the Sidle panel. The first occurred on April 21,
1985 in Honduras.18 9 The pool members, like all reporters who are
granted access to military operations, signed "Nondisclosure-Cen-
sorship" agreements. 90 The agreements state, among other things,
that the reporter agrees not to divulge classified military informa-
tion until he or she has been "properly authorized by the United
States Government to release it."' 9' The reporter also agrees to
submit all dispatches which might contain classified military infor-
mation to the Department of Defense for review. 192 The agreement
also states that the reporter acknowledges that the government has
"full authority to delete sensitive information"' 93 and warns that
breach of the agreement may result in criminal sanctions. 94
In addition to the restrictions listed in the Nondisclosure-Cen-
sorship agreement, the pool reporters were given a list of "ground
rules" for coverage of the military operation (the reporters were not
told that they were only part of a test). 95 The pool members were
instructed not to "mention to anyone" the fact that the pool had
been activated' 96 and that no stories were to be filed until the mate-
rial of all the pool members was released to other news organiza-
tions. 197 The pool reporters were also required to remain with their
military escorts at all times and to follow their instructions. 98
The first test of the press pool arrangement demonstrated that,
in spite of months of work done by the Sidle panel, the military
continues to lack an adequate understanding of how the news media
operate. 199 The secrecy of the pool activation appears to have been
non-existent."°  In fact, when the press pool landed in Honduras,
189. A second test occurred on September 19, 1985. Pentagon Tests New System, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1985, at D16, col. 5 ("The Pentagon said today [Sept. 19] that it secretly flew
12 reporters to a routine training exercise in Kentucky early this morning in a successful test
of a system for allowing news coverage of the early stages of American military operations.").
190. Draft of the Reporter Nondisclosure/Censorship Agreement; For Use by The Mili-





195. Pentagon Tests Media Coverage of Missions, BROADCASTING, Apr. 29, 1985, at 83.
196. Document entitled "Ground Rules" provided to pool members by the office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense on Apr. 21, 1985.
197. Id.
198. Id
199. Pentagon Tests Media Coverage of Missions, BROADCASTING, Apr. 29, 1985, at 83,
84.
200. Willenson, Frolics in Honduras, WASH. JOURNALISM REv., July 1985, at 17, 19.
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approximately two days after the pool had been activated, other
American reporters and photographers were waiting for them on
the beach at Puerto Castilla.2 °1
Benjamin Shore, a member of the Honduran test pool, noted in
a letter to the Washington Journalism Review that the Department
of Defense had alerted the news media that a military operation wasimminent eleven days before the pool was activated. 2 2  In addi-
tion, the Pentagon itself broke the secrecy of the pool's activation
before the pool members had gathered.20 3 The Pentagon publicly
acknowledged that a press pool had been activated in a phone call
from Jack Smith, CBS News Washington Bureau Chief.2°4  Smith
called because he was serving as chief of the network television pool
at the time but had not been notified of the activation.20 5 Also, the
Pentagon had notified CNN directly that it was to be the pool's
televison operator instead of notifying the chief of the television
pool as the established procedure provided.206
Other problems with the Honduran test showed that the mili-
tary had not engaged in the pre-activation planning0 7 that the Sidle
panel had concluded was crucial to successful military-media rela-
tions. Some of the eight news organizations which the Pentagon
selected to provide reporters and photographers were not notified
that they were candidates to participate in the pool until they were
invited to participate at 6 p.m. on April 20.208 Those news organi-
zations did not have time to make a careful selection of representa-
tives.2" 9 If they had had more time, they would have been better
able to select persons with knowledge of military operations and
with the physical ability to travel with military personnel in battle
conditions.
The problems of press access to reliable communication lines,
which occurred during the Grenada invasion, were again exper-
201. Id.
202. Letter from Benjamin Shore, of the Copley News Service, to the WASH. JOURNAL-
ISM REv. (June 26, 1985).
203. Pentagon Tests Media Coverage of Missions, BROADCASTING, Apr. 29, 1985, at 83,
84.
204. Id. at 84.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See letter from the eight news organizations (Associated Press, Cable News Net-
work, Copley News Service, Mutual Broadcasting, N.Y. Times, NEWSWEEK, United Press
International, and the Wall Street Journal), that participated in the Honduran test, to Secre-
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ienced in the Honduran test.210 The pool members were first told
by military officers that the Navy was unable to get an open line of
communication and that therefore the pool stories could not be
filed.21" The pool reporters later learned from a Navy communica-
tions officer that there were telephones on board Navy ships which
could reach the United States, but that the pool was not permitted
to use them.21 2 One of the pool members learned from a different
officer that troops were permitted to make calls to the United States
every night.213 Then, on the day the pool returned from the opera-
tion, the pool members learned from their editors that the pool re-
ports had been received in the form of Mailgrams by the news
media in the United States the morning after they were submitted to
military officers.214
Clearly, the military and the news media need to begin the pro-
cess of establishing an ongoing, meaningful dialogue. Any such
process must begin with the military and the news media gaining an
understanding of how the other operates. If this can be achieved,
and if both are willing to give enough to establish an acceptable
compromise, a workable solution to the current problem of press
coverage of military operations can be reached. Additional tests of
the pool arrangement will provide valuable knowledge of the
problems that are likely to occur during real operations, as well as
provide the military and the news media with the experience of en-
gaging in cooperative activities. None of this is likely to occur,
however, until the military and the news media change their com-
mon attitudes of "us versus them. '215
The Department of Defense should engage in regularly sched-
uled face-to-face discussions with members of the news media.
Such meetings could be held between the Secretary of Defense Me-
dia Advisory Committee, which was established by Secretary Wein-
berger in response to the Sidle panel's recommendations, 216 and the
chiefs of the current pool candidates. Large, comprehensive meet-
ings with representatives from all forms of the media should be
held, instead of the media-specific meetings the Pentagon has held
210. Id. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.




215. For a discussion of the difficulties which remain as obstacles to productive future
cooperation, see Denniston, Planning For Future Grenadas, THE QUILL, Jan. 1984, at 10.
216. See statement by the Secretary of Defense in August 23, 1984 press release accompa-
nying the release of the Sidle Panel Report to the public.
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in the past.2 17 Topics of discussion should initially include finaliz-
ing the procedure to be used to inform the selected news organiza-
tion of the pool activation. During the Honduran test, in addition
to its failure to notify all the pool chiefs, the military officers who
contacted the news organizations communicated sensitive informa-
tion to employees not designated to receive information about the
pool activation.218
The military must also educate the news organizations in the
basic scheme of military operations. Without a clear understanding
of routine military activities, the news media cannot report about
them accurately and completely. To perform their responsibilities
regarding military secrecy, reporters need to know what types of
information are sensitive. In addition, the news media must explain
to the military the basic functions and operations of news
organizations.
Another topic which should be discussed is the manner in which
the pool members will communicate the information contained in
their reports to the rest of the news organizations. Once each type
of news organization within the pool compiles its pool report, satel-
lite links must be provided to all news organizations in the United
States who desire access. In the past, a lack of planning, technical
difficulties and use of disinformation by military officials has re-
sulted in confusion and created ill-will and angry words between the
military and the news media.21
V. CONCLUSION
The objective of granting press freedom in the United States
Constitution was, in part, to ensure that the American public would
be fully and accurately informed about the affairs of government.
Prior restraint was one of the early tools used by governments to
supress dissemination of governmental information. To prevent the
government from thwarting the democratic ideal of a free press, the
prior restraint doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court.220  To-
day the government has become more sophisticated in the ways it
217. Letter from the eight news organizations that participated in the Honduran test to
Secretary Weinberger (Apr. 29, 1985).
218. Id.
219. See, eg., Willenson, Frolics in Honduras, WASH. JOURNALISM REv., July 1985, at
19 ("Back out at the ship we have our third argument in three days with [military officials]
over when, if ever, the Navy is going to file our copy.").
220. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (vacating a stay
which enjoined the publication of the Pentagon Papers).
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seeks to suppress dissemination of governmental information. Be-
ing all too aware of the prior restraint doctrine, the government has
decided to get around it by preventing the press from obtaining in-
formation in the first instance.
The action of a government in involving the nation in war has a
very direct effect upon individual life and liberty. If the government
is to require men to go to foreign lands to fight and die, the public
deserves to be fully and accurately informed about the circum-
stances and nature of the involvement. To this end, the press must
have access to overt military operations.
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